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The support effort of NWS Incident Meteorologists (IMET) was substantial and successful during Katrina. IMETs provide tactical and logistical weather information in support of a mission, such as clean up efforts after a major weather-related disaster. The hurricane disabled or destroyed weather sensors across the region. IMETs dispatched from other areas of the country, helped install temporary replacement equipment to monitor local weather conditions, including at New Orleans International Airport. They also provided briefings and forecasts for emergency responders and worked shifts for the WFO’s local employees so they could begin to get their lives back in order after Katrina. Due to the magnitude of the impacts of Hurricane Katrina, the NWS assembled a Service Assessment Team (SAT) to review the performance of its offices during the event. NWS service assessments are routinely conducted to identify and share best-case operations, procedures, and practices and address service deficiencies. The SAT evaluated the effectiveness of NWS services and operational procedures relating to the agency’s performance with respect to this event, paying particular attention to continuity of operations procedures/plans, coordination and collaboration with emergency managers and other decision makers, and forecast and warning accuracy. The SAT found that the NWS performed admirably, before, during, and after Katrina. Overall, the timeliness and accuracy of the forecast products and warnings issued by the NHC were well above average and contributed significantly to critical customer decision-making. The hurricane forecast track error was considerably better than average through the five-day forecast period. Lead times on hurricane watches and warnings for Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and the Florida panhandle were eight hours above average. The overall intensity forecast error for Katrina was larger than average; however, the intensity forecasts within 48 to 72 hours of landfall in southeast Louisiana correctly projected Katrina as a major hurricane (Category 3 or higher). The largest errors were associated with the rapid intensification of Katrina over the open eastern Gulf of Mexico. Throughout the event, NWS field offices provided high quality information to the public, mass media, and emergency management officials. A noteworthy moment for the NWS came when the Weather Forecast Office (WFO) in New Orleans/Baton Rouge issued a statement one day prior to Katrina’s landfall that emphasized the likely impacts of the hurricane on southeast Louisiana and coastal Mississippi. Due to the unprecedented detail and foreboding nature of the language used, the statement helped reinforce the actions of emergency management officials as they coordinated one of the largest evacuations in U.S. history. Service backup for offices affected by the communications outages was effective and transparent to most users and partners. However, the SAT noted several opportunities for improvement. Single points of failure in the commercial telecommunications system upon which the NWS relies in operations need to be identified and mitigated to improve continuity of operations plans for NWS field offices. The NWS should also explore an alternative communications system for NWS field offices to provide redundancy. Hardware and software requirements for extended periods of service backup support must be identified and addressed. Equipment failures and 2
Historic Hurricanes (Treutel Book) Historic-Hurricanes-Of-Hancock-County-1812-2012-(165)