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22b	THE	BRITISH AT THE GATES
brilliant affair, and brilliant consequences may attach to this success. For, besides that we have already forwarded to the advance nearly one thousand troops in these five gun-vessels, we expect by their means to take a fort which guards an important pass. . . . These gun-vessels will probably give us the command on Lake Pontchartrain.? This letter written on the sixteenth by Cochrane?s fleet captain, who acted as his chief of staff, indicates that it was still Cochrane?s intention to move through the Rigolets into Lake Pontchartrain. There is no evidence to show when Cochrane and Keane abandoned this plan. It is certain that Colonel Nicholls had strongly advised the route through Lake Pontchartrain, and this advice was supported by some of Cochrane?s naval staff working from maps which proved to be inaccurate."7 The narrow passes of Chef Menteur and the Rigolets proved, on examination, to prevent the passage of any vessel drawing eight feet, and the advantages of striking from above the city appeared to be outweighed by the ample warning which would be given to the defenders.
While Keane and Cochrane questioned their prisoners aud some local fishermen, the army was transported to the mouth of the Pearl River to be landed on Pea Island. This intermediate base was 60 miles from Cat Island, where the fleet lay at anchor, and it was soon found that the greater part of this journey had to be undertaken in ships? boats rowed by seamen. Battleships and large transports could not enter Lake Borgne, but every' effort was made to bring lighter vessels part of the way to Pea Island. Codrington records the orders he gave to ships? captains:"8 ?Keep on under sail after the smaller vessels ahead until your ship sticks fast in the mud; then find out deeper water, and go forward as far as you can get your ship by any means of lightening her.? The flotilla of shallow-draft barges could not carry more than
2,000	men at one time so the sailors were obliged to make the round trip of at least 60 miles three times to row the army to Pea Island, and several more journeys were required to bring up equipment and stores.
Pea Island was not the most attractive of sites for an army encampment. After confinement for ten hours in cramped positions in the boats, the soldiers were turned out on ?a swamp, containing a small space of firm ground at one end, and almost wholly unadorned with trees of any sort or description. There were, indeed a few stunted firs upon the very edge of the water, but these were so diminutive in size as hardly to deserve a higher classification than among the meanest of shrubs. The interior was the resort of wild ducks and other water-fowl; and the pools and creeks . . . abounded in dormant alligators. Upon this miserable desert the army was assembled, without tents or huts, or
The British Expedition	225
ing their mutually defensive crossfire. It was even more hampering to Lockycr?s barges. By ten thirty on December 14, when he began his attack, his seamen had been rowing for a period of forty-one hours, spending their rest periods at their oars and with no protection from the weather, which, at night, became uncomfortably cold. Seeing the enemy at anchor and ready to make a stand put new heart into the oarsmen. The Americans opened fire at extreme range, doing no damage. Lockyer reserved his fire until almost ten fifty,145 when the engagement became general and destructive. An hour later Lockyer?s division had concentrated on Jones? gunboat and began to board her while Montressor and Roberts assaulted the second vessel forward of the line, under Ulrick. Two of Lockyer?s barges were sunk, and he was wounded twice before he and his marines succeeded in cutting their way through the nets and boarding the first gunboat. Jones, severely wounded, had crawled below, but his men fought a desperate battle on deck before they were finally overwhelmed. Ulrick?s gunboat fell to the combined divisions of Roberts and Montressor, who turned the guns on the remaining American boats. Lieutenant Robert Spedden commanded his gunboat after both his arms had been shattered, John Ferris surrendered after his largest gun was dismounted and his boat boarded, and McKeever fought on until his decks became the target of all four captured American gunboats. At twelve forty the action was over, the British having 17 killed and 77 wounded. American losses were 10 killed, 35 wounded, and the whole of their crews taken prisoner.
The Battle of Lake Borgne reflects the greatest credit on both sides. The British enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in numbers; but their guns were small, and the long haul from the fleet to the enemy position, the last part under heavy and accurate fire and against a strong tide, required endurance and courage. The American gunboats were denied their greatest advantage, the ability to maneuver under sail and to draw the enemy under the guns of Fort Petites Coquilles, by wind and tide. Gallantly, they had gained precious time for Jackson and Patterson. No more could have been expected of them. Nevertheless, the news of their capture was a severe blow to Jackson. Though it had been anticipated, no provision had been made to replace the flotilla as the eyes and ears of Jackson?s defense. No detachments or scouts from his army were anywhere near the lake. For ten days Jackson was without intelligence of the enemy?s movements. It was an oversight which might have lost him the campaign.
Rear Admiral Codrington wrote of the battle:?It is a most